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THE NEW EXTRATERRITORIALITY: FRAND 
ROYALTIES, ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS AND THE 
GLOBAL RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN DISPUTES OVER 
STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
JORGE L. CONTRERAS* 
ABSTRACT 
National courts have long exercised extraterritorial authority over domestic 
entities whose conduct abroad is prohibited in the domestic jurisdiction. More 
recently, however, national courts have begun to use disputes over domestic 
patent rights as vehicles for shaping the global business arrangements of private 
parties, even absent any violation of national law. This phenomenon is 
particularly pronounced in the context of “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (FRAND) licenses of patents that are essential to the 
manufacture and sale of standardized products. This essay explores the 
increasing extraterritorial effect of national judicial decisions on licenses for 
standards-essential patents, including recent instances in which courts in the 
U.S. and UK have sought to establish global FRAND royalty rates for parties 
engaged in national patent litigation. It also examines the increasing use of the 
anti-suit injunction, a powerful procedural tool that can enjoin parallel foreign 
proceedings while disputes are adjudicated in a first jurisdiction. The 
combination of national courts’ willingness to determine global patent licensing 
rates, coupled with the rising prevalence of the anti-suit injunction, threatens to 
cause a new “race to the bottom” among jurisdictions in this commercially 
significant area of the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s markets for technology products — from smartphones to 
automobiles to pharmaceuticals — present a paradox for national dispute 
resolution systems. While such markets are inherently global in nature — with 
supply chains and distribution networks around the world — the power of 
national courts to exercise authority over participants in these markets is, by its 
very nature, confined to national borders. Despite this limitation, national courts 
have, in recent years, found ways to overcome or circumvent national constraints 
on their adjudicative power, generally by exercising leverage against the local 
operations of multinational firms within their jurisdictions.1 As a result, local 
actions have taken on extraterritorial scope, and national courts have expanded 
capabilities and incentives to influence the behavior of private parties beyond 
their borders. 
Of course, the extraterritorial reach of national law has long been an 
established feature of many legal regimes. U.S. companies, for example, may be 
subject to civil and criminal penalties for bribing foreign governmental 
officials,2 for doing business in Cuba,3 and for failing to report participation in 
international boycotts.4 More broadly, certain conduct of domestic entities 
abroad can be prosecuted under criminal,5 tax,6 and antitrust laws.7 In addition, 
intellectual property law — copyright, trademark and patent — also reaches 
beyond national borders in a growing list of areas including patent exhaustion, 
copyright first sale, and damages for overseas sales.8 In the vast majority of these 
 
1 Some argue that a similar trend toward extraterritorial remedies exists with regard to 
national enforcement agencies, particularly in the area of competition law. See, e.g., Koren 
Wong-Ervin, Warnings Against Global Patent Licensing Remedies, LAW360, (Dec. 11, 2017, 
8:50 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/993603/warnings-against-global-patent-
licensing-remedies (collecting sources from OECD conference critiquing extraterritorial 
remedies imposed by national competition law agencies in standards-related matters). While 
related, agency enforcement activity is beyond the scope of this essay. 
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
3 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms—Burton Act), 
22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2019). 
4 I.R.C. § 999 (1997). 
5 Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507, 508 
(2016). 
6 Robert T. Cole et al., Extraterritorial Effects of United States Tax Laws, 12 INT’L. 
LAWYER 581, 582 (1978). 
7 Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States 
and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1992). 
8 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual 
Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 743-744 (2009) 
(examining European copyright and trademark cases); Amy L. Landers, U.S. Patent 
Extraterritoriality within the International Context, 36 REV. LITIG. 28, 28-31 (2016) 
(exploring historical and treaty perspectives); Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, 
Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92(4) NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1779 
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cases, national courts seek to exercise extraterritorial authority over domestic 
entities when the foreign conduct in question is illegal or will cause harm in the 
domestic jurisdiction (e.g., bribery, price fixing, tax avoidance), or has legal 
effect in the domestic jurisdiction (e.g., foreign publications invalidating 
domestic patent rights and the exhaustion of domestic patent or copyright rights 
through foreign sales). However, national courts have only recently begun to use 
disputes over domestic patent rights as vehicles for shaping the global business 
arrangements of private parties, absent any violation of national law. 
The contracts in question concern the licensing of patents required to 
manufacture and sell products complying with global interoperability standards 
such as Wi-Fi and 3G/4G/5G wireless connectivity. Under the policies of the 
trade associations in which these standards are developed — broadly known as 
standards development organizations or “SDOs” — participants often agree to 
license their patents to producers of standardized products on terms that are 
royalty-free or, in the alternative, which bear royalties that are fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”).9 However, because the meaning of 
FRAND is not widely agreed upon throughout the industry, disputes often arise 
regarding royalty rates and other terms that patent holders must offer to potential 
licensees.10 
This essay explores the increasing extraterritorial effect of national judicial 
actions in the global wireless telecommunications market — specifically the so-
called “smart phone wars” and disputes over standards-essential patents. In 
particular, this essay focuses on the willingness and ability of national courts to 
fashion private global licensing arrangements on the basis of an alleged breach 
of the patentee’s FRAND commitment and the licensee’s alleged infringement 
of one or more domestic patents. This type of extraterritorial judicial contract 
formation stands in stark contrast to the judicial resolution of typical 
international contract disputes, in which courts determine whether or not a party 
has breached its contractual obligations and, if so, what remedy — monetary or 
injunctive — is warranted. Likewise, these efforts differ from judicial 
interpretations of the governing law of international contracts, which, while 
 
(2017) (discussing extraterritorial patent damages under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 271(a) and (f)); 
Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 105-106 
(2017) (comparing patent law and the law of the sea); Marketa Trimble, The Territorial 
Discrepancy between Intellectual Property Rights Infringement Claims and Remedies, 23 
LEWIS & CLARK L. Rev. (2019) (discussing Canadian judicial remedy against Google’s 
worldwide operations), P. Sean Morris, From Territorial to Universal—The 
Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and The Privatizing of International Law, 37 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 33 (2019) (analysing extraterritoriality under trademark law). 
9 See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based 
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (2013). 
10 See generally Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus A. Baron, Licensing Terms of 
Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy 
Report EUR 28302 (2017) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world). 
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undoubtedly affecting international commercial arrangements, do not actually 
create the very obligations between the parties. 
With the exception of the FRAND cases discussed herein, national courts 
have seldom sought to reform, or create, private contractual arrangements that 
extend beyond their national borders and involve patents over which they 
otherwise lack adjudicatory power. This trend presents a new and potentially 
problematic species of extraterritorial authority that national courts have 
asserted, both in the U.S. and abroad. 
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses recent 
instances in which national courts in the U.S. and UK have sought to establish 
global royalty rates for parties in resolving national patent litigation. Part II 
discusses the anti-suit injunction, a procedural tool increasingly invoked by 
parties and employed by courts to enjoin parallel foreign proceedings in FRAND 
disputes. Part III explores the possibility that these trends are leading to a global 
race to the bottom among jurisdictions and a race to the courthouse among 
litigants. This essay concludes with an assessment and proposed solutions. 
I. GLOBAL FRAND RATE DETERMINATIONS 
Courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates must make a choice grounded in 
contradiction. On one hand, patents are established under national law and, by 
definition, have legal effect only in the issuing jurisdiction.11 On the other hand, 
the parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with 
operations (and patents) in jurisdictions around the world. In determining a 
FRAND royalty rate, a court must decide whether to focus only on the patents 
issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or to consider the global business 
relationship between the parties. In several such cases, the courts have limited 
their FRAND rate determinations to the patents before them. However, a number 
of courts have evidenced a willingness to specify the details of a global FRAND 
license between the parties, thus covering not only their national patents, but 
other patents around the world that are subject to the licensor’s FRAND 
commitment. Part I of this essay briefly discusses cases adopting the traditional 
approach of assessing royalties for in-country patents only, and then analyzes in 
greater detail those recent cases in which courts have elected to establish global 
FRAND royalty rates. 
A. National Royalty Determinations 
The traditional U.S. approach to damages in patent cases is to assess a 
reasonable royalty for infringing products made, used or sold. Cases involving 
FRAND royalty determinations are somewhat different, as the court-assessed 
royalty rates in such cases are not necessarily intended as compensatory 
damages, but as the rates that the patent holder should have offered to the 
 
11 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent 
Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1745 (2017). 
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infringer under its FRAND commitment.12 Thus, the outcome of such a 
determination is often the issuance of a license by the patent holder to the 
infringer, and the infringer’s payment of back royalties for the period prior to 
the issuance of the license. 
U.S. district courts followed this pattern in two of the first adjudicated 
FRAND royalty disputes, Microsoft v. Motorola13 and Innovatio.14 In both of 
these cases, which have been the subject of extensive discussion,15 the courts 
analyzed only the U.S. patents before them, with little discussion of patents or 
royalties in other jurisdictions.16 
More recently, in Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd. 
(“Optis v. Huawei”),17 a case involving patents declared as essential to European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”)’s 4G LTE wireless 
telecommunication standard, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas dismissed a motion by the patent holder, PanOptis,18 seeking a declaration 
that its global licensing offer to Huawei complied with PanOptis’s FRAND 
 
12 See Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft IV), 795 F.3d 1024, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(specifically noting that the case was “not a patent law action”). See also generally Jorge L. 
Contreras et al., The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT 
REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, Ch. 5 (C. Bradford 
Biddle et al. eds., 2019) (presenting a more detailed discussion of this distinction and its 
application across jurisdictions). 
13 Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft III), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash., 
2013), aff’d 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
14 In re. Innovatio IP Ventures LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 144061, at *49 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
15 See generally, e.g., Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined 
FRAND Royalties, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: 
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 365, 377 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). See also J. 
Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION LAW & ECON. 
931, 968-88 (2013). 
16 See Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *43-44 (“[T]he court determines … that the 
RAND rate to be paid to Innovatio for licensing Innovatio’s portfolio of nineteen 802.11 
standard-essential patents is 9.56 cents for each Wi-Fi chip use or sold by the Manufacturers 
in the United States”) (emphasis added); Microsoft III, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *80 
(noting that with respect to the H.264 standard, there were over 2,500 patents declared as 
essential worldwide, of which over 360 were issued in the U.S.); id. at *134 (noting that 
“[b]roadcast television in the United States uses MPEG-2, not [the] H.264 [standard].”) 
(emphasis added). 
17 No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018). 
18 PanOptis Patent Management LLC consists of a group of companies, including Optis 
Wireless Technology, LLC and Optis Cellular Technology, LLC, all of which are wholly-
owned by Inception Holdings LLC. Unwired Planet, LLC and Unwired Planet International 
Limited are also members of the PanOptis corporate family. See Plaintiffs’ Emergency 
Motion for Antisuit Injunction and Request for Expedited Briefing at *4, Optis Wireless 
Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. 
Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Optis Anti-Suit Motion]. 
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commitment.19 Instead, Judge Gilstrap instructed the jury to assess a FRAND 
royalty rate only for the six U.S. patents in dispute, disregarding other patents 
held by PanOptis around the world.20 In rejecting PanOptis’s request, the 
magistrate judge (whose decision Judge Gilstrap adopted) reasoned that setting 
a global FRAND rate would be akin to adjudicating a foreign patent 
infringement claim, an action that “is almost always an abuse of discretion”.21 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the following sections, many judges have not 
exercised this degree of judicial restraint. 
B. Vringo v. ZTE (UK - High Court (Patents) (2014)) 
Vringo v. ZTE involved patents essential to the 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless 
telecommunications standards developed within ETSI.22 Vringo, a patent 
assertion entity, purchased a group of patents covering these standards from 
Nokia, which had participated in the development of the standards.23 Vringo 
acknowledged its obligation, inherited from Nokia, to license the patents on 
FRAND terms.24 
ZTE, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications infrastructure 
equipment, allegedly infringed some of these patents.25 In October 2012, Vringo 
brought patent infringement actions against ZTE around the world, including an 
action in the UK High Court for Patents.26 The case in the High Court was 
 
19 Order, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-
RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018) (adopting Report and Recommendation of 
Magistrate Judge Roy S. Payne) [hereinafter Optis Order]. For a discussion of other aspects 
of this case, see David Long, Jury Awards Running Royalty for Willfully Infringed SEPs 
subject to FRAND Commitment (Optis v. Huawei), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/08/jury-awards-running-royalty-infringed-seps-
optis-v-huawei/ [https://perma.cc/64SY-89VD]. 
20 Five of the six patents asserted were declared to be essential to the ETSI standard. See 
Final Jury Instructions at *6, *24, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., 
No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2018). 
21 Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Recommendations at *2, *15, Optis Wireless Tech., 
LLC, v. Huawei Device Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-123-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 476054 (E.D. Tex. 
Jan. 18, 2018). 
22 Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988 (LAK), 2015 WL 3498634, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 3, 2015). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. See generally Marc Sandy Block, Transfers of Standards Essential Patents, in 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, 
AND PATENTS, ch. 14 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018) (discussing the transferability of FRAND 
commitments following a transfer of the underlying patents). 
25 Vringo, 2015 WL 3498634, at *1. 
26 See generally Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 (Eng.). See also David L. Cohen, 
A Short History of Vringo’s Battle with ZTE, LINKEDIN (Oct. 11, 2017) 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/short-history-vringos-battle-zte-david-l-cohen/ 
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adjudicated by the Hon. Mr. Justice Birss who, in November 2014, found that 
one of the UK patents that Vringo asserted against ZTE was both valid and 
essential to the ETSI 3G and 4G standards.27 Accordingly, a full trial was 
scheduled for June 2015 to consider issues of infringement and the entry of an 
injunction.28 Vringo, however, moved to stay the patent trial until after a later 
hearing scheduled for early 2016, in which issues surrounding Vringo’s FRAND 
commitment were to be resolved.29 
Vringo wished to postpone the patent trial with ZTE to first determine 
whether the license that Vringo had offered to ZTE complied with Vringo’s 
FRAND commitment to ETSI.30 Vringo reasoned that if the license offer was in 
fact FRAND and ZTE refused it, then Vringo should automatically be entitled 
to an injunction in the UK under its patent which, in 2014, was found to be valid 
and essential to the ETSI standards, given that ZTE’s products clearly 
implemented those standards.31 
In this case, the license that Vringo offered to ZTE was a global portfolio 
license covering all of Vringo’s relevant patents world-wide (presumably to 
resolve the parties’ global litigation).32 Vringo argued that global portfolio 
licenses are the norm in the industry, an assertion that Mr. Justice Birss 
accepted.33 ZTE, however, rejected Vringo’s global licensing offer, arguing that 
with respect to the action in the UK, ZTE need only obtain a license under 
Vringo’s valid UK patents, and not the other patents at issue throughout the 
world.34 
In denying Vringo’s request to postpone the June 2015 patent trial, Mr. Justice 
Birss highlighted Vringo’s insistence on offering ZTE a global license rather 
than a license limited to the UK.35 He first rejected Vringo’s argument that 
ZTE’s failure to accept a global license indicated that ZTE was an unwilling 
infringer who should be subject to an injunction.36 He noted that: 
[J]ust because it may be so that the global portfolio offer is a FRAND offer, 
it does not follow that the global portfolio licence on offer is the only set of 
 
[https://perma.cc/S7C9-D6RS] (providing an overview of the worldwide patent dispute 
between Vringo and ZTE). 
27 Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 [156]-[157] (Eng.). 
28 Vringo v. ZTE [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [101] (Eng.). 
29 Id. at [102]. 
30 Id. at [105]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at [103]. 
33 Id. at [107]. 
34 Id. at [104]. 
35 Id. at [105]-[106], [113]. 
36 Id. at [105]-[107]. The European Court of Justice held in Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE 
Corp., that a patent holder subject to a FRAND commitment may violate EU competition law 
if it seeks an injunction against an infringer that is willing to accept a license on FRAND 
terms. See generally C-170/13, 2015 E.C.R. 477. 
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terms which could be FRAND. It seems to me that there is likely to be a 
FRAND rate for [the UK patent].37 
Accordingly, if Vringo had offered ZTE a FRAND license for the UK patent 
alone, and ZTE rejected that license, Vringo might indeed be entitled to an 
injunction.38 However, as Vringo had only offered ZTE a global license, even if 
that global license were FRAND, the court could not find ZTE to be an unwilling 
licensee.39 Doing so, in fact, would facilitate a form of “international coercion” 
in which the threat of an injunction in the UK could be used to force a licensee 
to acquire — i.e., pay for — undesired rights in other jurisdictions.40 For this 
and other reasons Mr. Justice Birss rejected Vringo’s argument that its only 
obligation under its FRAND commitment was to offer a global license that was 
on FRAND terms.41 
C. Unwired Planet v. Huawei (UK - High Court (Patents) (2017)) 
In Unwired Planet v. Huawei,42 Unwired Planet, a U.S.-based patent assertion 
entity,43 sued Huawei for infringement of six UK patents that it acquired from 
Ericsson,44 two of which the court found essential to ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G 
 
37 Vringo v. ZTE, [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [107] (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at [109]. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at [108]-[109]. 
41 Id. at [107]. 
42 Unwired Planet Intl. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. (Unwired Planet I) [2017] EWHC 
(Pat) 711 (Eng.), aff’d Unwired Planet Intl. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. (Unwired Planet 
II) [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.) As of this writing, leave to appeal to the UK Supreme 
Court has been granted. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. (UK) Co Ltd., Order 
(Sup. Ct. UK, Apr. 11, 2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-
court-of-uk-grants-huaweis.html). For additional discussion and analysis of this case, see 
generally Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many 
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 1 [hereinafter 
Contreras, Global Markets]; J. Gregory Sidak, Why Unwired Planet Might Revolutionize the 
Resolution of FRAND Licensing Disputes, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 601 (2018) [Sidak, 
Unwired Planet]; Thomas F. Cotter, Some Thoughts on Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES BLOG (Apr. 17, 2017), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2017/04/some-thoughts-on-unwired-planet-
v-huawei.html [https://perma.cc/XA2T-X8LH]. 
43 Unwired Planet is an affiliate of PanOptis. See Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, 
at *4. The UK litigation discussed here is part of a global patent battle waged by PanOptis 
and its affiliates against Huawei in the U.S., UK, Germany, China and other countries. Id. at 
*1, *3. 
44 Ericsson is a Swedish telecommunications company. See About us, ERICSSON, 
https://www.ericsson.com/en/about-us [https://perma.cc/L9R7-6FPJ] (last visited Apr. 6, 
2019). 
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wireless telecommunications standards.45 As Ericsson had participated in 
development of the standards at ETSI, the court considered the patents to be 
encumbered by Ericsson’s FRAND commitment to ETSI.46 
Unwired Planet sued Huawei, among others, for infringement of these patents 
in the UK and sought an injunction preventing Huawei from selling infringing 
products (such as smartphones and tablets) in the UK.47 Huawei argued that it 
was entitled under the terms of Unwired Planet’s (i.e., Ericsson’s) FRAND 
commitment to ETSI to receive a license to practice the patents on FRAND 
terms. 48 As a result, it argued that Unwired Planet’s prior licensing offers were 
not FRAND and thus in violation of European competition law.49 In response, 
Unwired Planet requested that the court fashion a global FRAND license 
between the parties, and if Huawei did not accept the court-determined license, 
to issue an injunction against Huawei’s sale of infringing products in the UK.50 
Huawei responded that the UK court could not and should not enforce non-
UK patent rights, and instead should determine only the relevant FRAND 
royalty as to Unwired Planet’s two valid UK patents.51 Huawei further argued 
that Unwired Planet’s insistence on a global license, when only two UK patents 
were at issue, constituted a violation of European competition law inasmuch as 
Unwired Planet sought to use its dominant position in the UK to tie unwanted 
global patents to its UK patents.52 
Like Vringo v. ZTE, Unwired Planet went before Mr. Justice Birss. In 
Unwired Planet, however, the judge reversed his previous position regarding 
global versus UK-only licensing.53 Responding favorably to Unwired Planet’s 
offer of a global license, he first observed that the ETSI standards in question 
are intended for use around the world, both by equipment manufacturers and by 
consumers.54 Next, he noted that “the vast majority” of standards-related 
 
45 Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [1]. Unwired Planet originally brought 
suit under six patents, five of which were alleged to be essential to the standards in question, 
and two of which were ultimately found to be essential to those standards. Unwired Planet II 
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344, at [6]-[7]. 
46 The court reached this conclusion without discussion, citing Article 6.1bis of the ETSI 
IPR policy, which notes that an ETSI participant’s FRAND undertaking “should be binding 
on successors in title.” Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 at [87(i)]. See also generally 
Block, supra note 24 (discussing transfer of FRAND obligations). 
47 Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [23(i)]. 
48 Id. at [23(ii)]. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at [23(i)]. 
51 Id. at [526]. 
52 Id. (“Huawei submitted that it is a fundamental principle of EU competition law that a 
dominant undertaking cannot tie or bundle together, with a product or service in respect of 
which it holds a dominant position, some other product or service which does not fall within 
the same market.”). 
53 See Vringo v. ZTE [2014] EWHC (Pat) 3924 [108]-[109] (Eng.). 
54 Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [91]. 
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licenses in the industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at 
trial, were granted on a worldwide basis, with only occasional exclusions.55 
He then emphasized that both Unwired Planet and Huawei were global 
enterprises.56 Mr. Justice Birss thus concluded that “a licensor and licensee 
acting reasonably and on a willing basis would agree on a worldwide licence.”57 
He considered the prospect of two large multinational companies agreeing to 
country-by-country licensing — the very arrangement that he seemingly 
advocated in Vringo — to be “madness.”58 With regard to Huawei’s claim that 
Unwired Planet’s insistence on a global license contradicted EU competition 
law, Mr. Justice Birss again relied on the commonplace nature of worldwide 
FRAND licenses to conclude that such licenses were unlikely to have 
anticompetitive effects or to distort competition.59 
Huawei also contended that a UK-determined worldwide license would limit 
a licensee’s ability and incentive to challenge patents in other countries — 
notably Germany, where Huawei was actively challenging Unwired Planet’s 
patents.60 Furthermore, Huawei suggested that once the licensee committed to 
pay royalties worldwide, it effectively admits the validity of the patents around 
the world.61 Mr. Justice Birss rejected that argument, noting that “[a] FRAND 
licence should not prevent a licensee from challenging validity or essentiality of 
licensed patents and should have provisions dealing with sales in non-patent 
countries” — i.e., excusing the payment of royalties in countries in which no 
valid patents subsist.62 
Accordingly, and in direct contradiction with his prior reasoning in Vringo, 
Mr. Justice Birss held that a FRAND license can only be a worldwide license.63 
Mr. Justice Birss distinguished his holding from Vringo in that the cases were 
“not dealing with the same problem,” and admitted that “what seemed clear to 
[in Vringo did] not seem . . . as clear cut” in Unwired Planet.64 
 
55 See id. at [534]. Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China. Id. 
56 Id. at [538]. 
57 Id. at [543]. 
58 Id. 
59 Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [535]. 
60 Id. at [536], [565]-[567]. 
61 Id. at [536] 
62 Id. at [567]. 
63 Id. at [572] (A “licence with a UK only scope is not FRAND.”). 
64 Id. at [560]. Specifically, he expressed concern that if both a global license and a UK-
only license could be FRAND, courts would not be able to pinpoint a single FRAND royalty 
rate to resolve the dispute, and lamented that “if . . . both kinds of licence — UK only and 
worldwide — are FRAND in the circumstances of this case then FRAND cannot be enforced 
at all.” Id. at [561]. 
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The court next determined the FRAND royalty rates that Huawei should pay 
to Unwired Planet on a global basis.65 The court first computed a “benchmark” 
FRAND royalty rate for the patents covering each standard at issue.66 Next, the 
court determined a specific royalty rate for three different groups: (1) Major 
Markets; (2) Other Markets; and (3) China.67 The court held that Major Markets 
were those countries in which Unwired Planet held more than two or three 
patents covering at least one of the standards at issue.68 The court applied the 
benchmark rate in Major Markets69 and, with little explanation, a rate equal to 
50% of the benchmark rate to China and Other Markets.70 
Huawei appealed the High Court’s decision on several grounds.71 However, 
the Court of Appeal rejected Huawei’s arguments —affirming the High Court’s 
ruling and global FRAND rate determination.72 The Court of Appeal reasoned 
that the High Court’s decision did not seek to usurp any foreign court’s 
determination as to patents in its own country.73 Rather, the decision related 
solely to a global agreement between Huawei and Unwired Planet and thus, no 
issue of comity was raised, nor was any implication created with respect to 
 
65 See id. at [582]-[592]. A detailed discussion of the complex and painstaking royalty 
calculation method followed by Mr. Justice Birss in Unwired Planet I is beyond the scope of 
this essay. For more information on this matter, see, generally, Contreras, Global Markets, 
supra note 42, at 8-11; Sidak, Unwired Planet, supra note 42; Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 
15, at 386-89. 
66 Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, at [586], [807(8)]. 
67 Id. at [587], [807(13)]. 
68 Id. at [587]. Major Markets included France, Germany, India, Japan, UK, U.S., Canada, 
Italy, Spain, Taiwan, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Argentina, Australia 
and South Korea. Id. 
69 Id. at [587], [591]. 
70 Id. at [583], [589] (“The appropriate rate for China is not complicated to arrive at. The 
comparable licences show that rates are often lower in China than for the rest of the world. 
The relative factor varies. I find that a FRAND licence would use a factor of 50%. . . . The 
rate of [Other Markets] countries would be the China rate on the basis that the products are 
made in China under licence.”) 
71 Huawei challenged three rulings of the lower court on appeal including: (1) the 
determination of FRAND royalty rates on a global basis; (2) the imposition of a royalty rate 
that substantially differed from that charged to another similarly-situated licensee, Samsung, 
under the non-discrimination prong of Unwired Planet’s FRAND commitment; and (3) the 
failure to require Unwired Planet to comply with the European Court of Justice’s procedural 
framework established in Huawei v. ZTE, Case C-170/13, 2015 Bus L.R. 1261, before seeking 
an injunction against Huawei. Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344, at [19]-[21]. In 
support of its challenges, Huawei argued that Mr. Justice Birss’s approach in Unwired Planet 
I: (i)… pays insufficient heed to the principle of comity or to the appropriate limitations on 
the exercise of the court’s powers in cases touching on foreign patents; (ii)…necessarily and 
wrongly presumes infringement of at least some valid SEPs in territories outside the UK; and 
(iii)…is contrary to public policy and disproportionate. 
72 Id. at [56], [74], [81], [99], [113], [290]-[291]. 
73 Id. at [81]. 
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infringement in any jurisdiction outside the UK.74 The Court of Appeal further 
dismissed Huawei’s concerns as to public policy and disproportionality, 
reiterating that the High Court-fashioned license “conform[ed] in its scope to 
normal practice in the industry” and that Unwired Planet had “always taken the 
position that in all the circumstances a FRAND licence would be a worldwide 
licence.”75 In sum, the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s ruling and 
allowed its global FRAND rate determination to stand. 
The decision in Unwired Planet has been appealed to the UK Supreme 
Court,76 but barring a reversal, other UK judges have indicated that they intend 
to follow that case’s approach of adjudicating global licenses in FRAND cases.77 
D. TCL v. Ericsson (U.S. - C.D. Cal. (2017)) 
Similarly, TCL v. Ericsson involved Ericsson’s commitment to grant TCL, a 
Chinese manufacturer of low-cost smartphones, a license for patents essential to 
ETSI’s 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless standards on FRAND terms.78 Unlike Huawei 
in Unwired Planet, TCL voluntarily negotiated with Ericsson for a global 
portfolio license.79 Accordingly, the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California took as a starting point the need to calculate FRAND royalty rates 
for a global portfolio license,80 and was particularly sensitive to regional 
variations in patent value.81 Judge Selna, in his opinion, recognized that not all 
countries are created equal in terms of patent portfolio strength and that some 
variation in royalty rates among countries is warranted.82 However, he went on 
to make the practical observation that courts are not equipped to “resolve 
disputes involving the technical nuances of patent law in dozens of 
 
74 Id. at [80]-[81], [88]. 
75 Id. at [98], [104]. 
76 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. (UK) Co Ltd., Order (Sup. Ct. UK, Apr. 11, 
2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-uk-grants-
huaweis.html. 
77 See, e.g., TQ Delta, LLC v Zyxel Commc’ns UK Ltd. [2019] EWHC 353 (Pat) [25] 
(Carr J). (“In relation to global licences for FRAND/RAND cases, the principles have been 
very clearly set by the Court of Appeal, in particular in Lord Kitchin’s judgment in Unwired 
Planet v Huawei.”) 
78 TCL Comm. Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-
00341, 2017 WL 6611635, at *2, *4-*6, *22 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 21, 2017). 
79 Id. at *6 (“TCL and Ericsson agreed to engage in a binding court adjudication of terms 
for a worldwide portfolio license.”) (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at *46-*50. 
81 Id. at *44-*46 (“[T]o look at patent families in the abstract without regard to where 
actual patents are enforceable would result in a subsidy to consumers in countries where the 
SEP owner has more enforceable patents from consumers that are not legally obligated to pay 
such a royalty. In essence, a global patent rate that does not account for differences in national 
patent strength provides the SEP owner a royalty based on features that are unpatented in 
many jurisdictions.”). 
82 Id. 
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jurisdictions,” and that as a result, when disputes and geographic disparities are 
insignificant, it is more practical for courts to use a generalized royalty structure 
for global adjudications.83 
After considering extensive expert testimony regarding regional differences 
in Ericsson’s portfolio strength, the court divided the world into four regions: 
(1) China; (2) the United States, (3) Europe, and (4) the Rest of the World 
(“ROW”).84 Next, Judge Selna adjusted the FRAND royalty rate by region and 
standard according to Ericsson’s portfolio strength.85 Ultimately, the court 
arrived at the following comparative weighing of regional portfolio values: 
 
Table 186 
FRAND Royalty Regional Adjustments in TCL v. Ericsson 
 2G 3G 4G 
United States 100% 100% 100% 
Europe 72.2% 87.9% n/a 
China/ROW 54.9% 74.8% 69.8% 
 
The court then spent considerable energy calculating the baseline FRAND 
royalty rate using both top-down and comparable license methodologies.87 Thus, 
in TCL v. Ericsson, the U.S. court determined a global FRAND royalty rate, but 
in doing so gave at least some attention to national variations in patent strength 
and coverage. This decision has also been appealed. 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at *45-*46. 
85 Id. Judge Selna noted that he would have preferred these proportions to be expressed by 
country rather than by region, but the expert testimony that was presented at trial only 
specified such results by region. Id. at *45. Compare id., with Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC 
(Pat) 711, at [583] (finding, somewhat arbitrarily, a 50% reduction to the FRAND royalty in 
Minor Markets and China). 
86 TCL Comm. Tech. Holdings, 2017 WL 6611635, at *45. 
87 See id. at *46-50. The mechanics of this analysis are beyond the scope of this essay, but 
for a more detailed discussion and critique, see Jorge L. Contreras, TCL v. Ericsson: The First 
Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contreras-ericsson-decision.html 
[https://perma.cc/MKZ9-ZV7L]. See also Fei Deng, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, 
Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 32 ANTITRUST, July 2018, 
at 47-49 (comparing differing top-down methodologies in Unwired Planet v. Huawei and TCL 
v. Ericsson); Peter Georg Picht, FRAND Determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired 
Planet v. Huawei: Same but Different?, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION RESEARCH PAPER 18-07 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177975; Thomas F. 
Cotter, Thoughts on the TCL v. Ericsson FRAND Decision, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES 
BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/01/thoughts-on-
tcl-v-ericsson-frand.html [https://perma.cc/8FYV-8RQK]. But see J. Gregory Sidak, Judge 
Selna’s Errors in TCL v. Ericsson Concerning Apportionment, Nondiscrimination, and 
Royalties Under the FRAND Contract, 4 Criterion J. Innovation 101 (2019) (criticizing 
decision). 
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E. Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE (UK - High Court (Patents) (2018)) 
Conversant is a Luxembourg patent assertion entity with principal operations 
in Canada and the United States.88 It claims to hold patents that it acquired from 
Nokia and that are essential to ETSI standards in 40 countries.89 For several 
years, Conversant engaged in negotiations to license its global portfolio of 
patents to Huawei and ZTE — both of which are Chinese mobile device 
manufacturers with global operations90 and who have disputed whether any of 
Conversant’s patents are valid and essential to the ETSI standards.91 
As a result, litigation commenced in several jurisdictions, including in the 
UK.92 Conversant petitioned the court to declare that its global license offers to 
Huawei and ZTE complied with its FRAND obligations.93 Huawei and ZTE then 
challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court — a challenge which was rejected 
on appeal.94 As of this writing, leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court has 
been granted.95 
II. STAYING INTERNATIONAL FRAND LITIGATION WITH ANTI-SUIT 
INJUNCTIONS 
Anti-suit injunctions — “interlocutory remed[ies] issued by a court in one 
jurisdiction to prohibit a litigant from initiating or continuing parallel litigation 
in another jurisdiction” — are intended to contain litigation costs and reduce the 
likelihood of inconsistent results across jurisdictions by ensuring that issues are 
resolved in one jurisdiction before they are litigated elsewhere.96 While anti-suit 
injunctions are available in Europe, they are primarily used in the United 
 
88 Huawei Techs. Co. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] EWCA (Civ) 38 
[7] (Eng.). 
89 Id. at [4], [7]. 
90 Id. at [7]-[10]. 
91 Id. at [11]. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at [20]-[23]. 
94 Id. at [112]. 
95 Huawei Techs. Co Ltd. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing SARL, Order (Sup. Ct. UK, 
Apr. 11, 2019), available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-uk-
grants-huaweis.html. 
96 Jorge L. Contreras & Michael A. Eixenberger, The Anti-Suit Injunction - A 
Transnational Remedy for Multi-Jurisdictional SEP Litigation, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENT 
LAW 451 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). For more in depth discussion of anti-suit injunctions, 
see, generally, THOMAS RAPHAEL, THE ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION (Oxford Univ. Press, 2008) 
(focusing on UK law); Richard W. Raushenbush, Antisuit Injunctions and International 
Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039 (1985); Alexander Shaknes, Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit 
Injunctions in Multi-Jurisdictional Proceedings, 21 INTL. L. PRACTICUM 96 (2008); Daniel 
Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INTL. L. 283 (2005). 
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States.97 There are a number of reasons that a prospective licensee might seek 
an anti-suit injunction, particularly in the context of standards. Such injunctions: 
[C]an be particularly powerful tools for prospective licensees alleging that 
[patent] holders have failed to comply with their FRAND licensing 
commitments. Specifically, a court reviewing a [patent] holder’s 
compliance with a FRAND licensing commitment may issue an anti-suit 
injunction to prevent the [patent] holder from bringing foreign patent 
infringement claims (including injunctions against the sale of infringing 
products) until the question of licensing terms has been resolved in the 
issuing jurisdiction.98 
In the United States, there are some variations in the tests applied by different 
courts to assess the propriety of an anti-suit injunction.99 Traditionally, however, 
courts purport to follow some variant of the three-part framework developed by 
the Ninth Circuit in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.100 Under the 
Gallo framework, a court considering a request for an anti-suit injunction must 
first determine whether the parties and the issues in the action in which the 
injunction is sought (the local action) are functionally equivalent to those in the 
action sought to be enjoined (the foreign action).101 If not, an injunction barring 
the parties from pursuing the foreign action would not reduce duplicative 
litigation, and would thus be unjustified. If the parties and the issues are 
functionally the same, the court must also determine whether resolution of the 
local action would be dispositive of the foreign action.102 Generally, a court is 
unlikely to find that an anti-suit injunction is justified if the local action does not 
result in the resolution of the foreign action.103 Second, the court must assess 
whether any of the four factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in In re Unterweser 
 
97 See Contreras & Eixenberger, supra note 96, at 455. 
98 Id. at 451. 
99 Tan, supra note 96, at 289 (“[In the United States, t]here are two main approaches, 
neither providing a clear and workable test to guide the courts in the anti-suit injunction 
inquiry.”). 
100 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (Microsoft II), 696 F.3d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 
2012) (examining the three-part inquiry established in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores 
S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
101 Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co., 587 F.3d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Functionally equivalent parties can include parties that are members of the same corporate 
family, even if based in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., APR Energy, LLC v. First Inv. Group 
Corp., 88 F.Supp.3d 1300, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (finding parent and subsidiary corporations 
to be “effectively the same” for anti-suit injunction proceedings). Functional similarity of 
issues depends upon whether “all the issues in the foreign action can be resolved in the local 
action.” Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 882-83. The issues “need not be ‘precisely and verbally 
identical,’ as ‘the verbal form of laws in different countries will inevitably differ.’” Id. at 883; 
see also Applied Med., 587 F.3d at 915. 
102 Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 881. 
103 See id. at 888-89. 
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Reederei104 are present. These factors include whether the foreign litigation 
would “(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious 
or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; 
or (4) prejudice other equitable considerations.”105 Any of the four factors may 
justify the entry of an anti-suit injunction.106 Finally, if at least one of these 
factors is present, the court must ask whether the injunction will have a 
significant impact on international comity.107 
In addition to applying the Gallo analysis to assess the propriety of an anti-
suit injunction, the U.S. district court in Microsoft v. Motorola considered the 
traditional four-factor analysis for preliminary injunctive relief.108 However, on 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit essentially eliminated this extra step.109 
As noted above, U.S. courts vary in their specific analyses of anti-suit 
injunctions. Below is a summary of the principal anti-suit injunction decisions 
relating to FRAND disputes both in the U.S. and the UK. 
A. Microsoft v. Motorola (U.S. - W.D. Wash. (2012)) 
In Microsoft v. Motorola (Microsoft I),Microsoft alleged that Motorola 
breached its commitment to offer Microsoft a patent license on FRAND110 terms 
in violation of the policies of two SDOs, the International Telecommunications 
 
104 In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), aff’d on reh’g, 
446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
105 Id. 
106 Gallo, 446 F.3d at 990 (“[I]f any of the four elements is present, an anti-suit injunction 
may be proper.”). 
107 Id. at 991 (“[W]e may rely on any of the Unterweser factors if it applies to the case and 
if the impact on comity is tolerable.”). 
Comity is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty 
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under 
the protection of its laws. 
Id. at 994 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)). 
108 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. (Microsoft I), 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012), aff’d, Microsoft II, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). 
109 “Ordinarily, we do not assess at all the likelihood of success on the merits in a case like 
this, because when a preliminary injunction is also a foreign anti-suit injunction, the 
likelihood-of-success aspect of the traditional preliminary injunction test is replaced by the 
Gallo test.” Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 883-84. See Order Granting Samsung’s Mot. for Antisuit 
Injunction at 7-8, Huawei Techs., Co., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No 3:16-cv-02787-WHO (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (citing and following Microsoft II). 
110 The SDO policies at issue in Microsoft v. Motorola required the licensing of patents on 
“reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms (RAND). See Microsoft I, 871 F.3d at 1093. 
However, for consistency of discussion, these are referred to as FRAND herein. 
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Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).111 
When negotiations over the FRAND license requested by Microsoft broke 
down, Microsoft brought a breach of contract claim against Motorola in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Washington.112 Six months later, 
Motorola sued Microsoft for patent infringement in Germany.113 The German 
court, finding infringement, enjoined Microsoft from selling infringing Xbox 
and laptop computer products in Germany.114 In response, Microsoft sought an 
anti-suit injunction from the federal district court in Washington to prevent 
Motorola from enforcing the German injunction.115 
Given that the two actions involved the same parties, the court first considered 
whether the issues in the U.S. and German cases were effectively the same.116 
Even though the suits technically involved different causes of action — breach 
of contract in the U.S. and patent infringement in Germany — the court 
determined that the resolution of the U.S. matter would be dispositive of the 
German matter.117 The court reasoned that if Motorola were found in the U.S. to 
have breached its FRAND obligation to the relevant SDOs, then Motorola would 
not be entitled to seek injunctive relief against Microsoft in any jurisdiction, 
including Germany.118 
Next, the district court asked whether “‘continuation of the foreign litigation 
would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction.’ . . [Including] 
policies against avoiding inconsistent judgments, forum shopping and engaging 
in duplicative and vexatious litigation.”119 Given that the issue of injunctive 
relief was before both courts, the district court considered the possibility of 
inconsistent judgments.120 Further, the district court noted that Motorola’s 
various litigation tactics frustrated the court’s ability to properly adjudicate the 
 
111 This dispute was related to two industry standards utilized in Microsoft’s XBox and 
laptop computer products: ITU’s H.264 advanced video coding standard and IEEE’s 802.11 
Wi-Fi standard. See id. at 1093-95. 
112 Id. at 1089. 
113 Id. at 1096 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1098 (“Here the parties admit that for purposes of an anti-suit injunction the 
parties are the same.”). 
117 Id. at 1099-100. 
118 Id. In making this determination, it was particularly relevant that Motorola’s 
commitment to ITU required that it grant Microsoft a worldwide license under all of 
Motorola’s relevant patents, including those asserted in the German case. See id. at 1096. 
119 Id. at 1100 (citing Applied Med. Distrib. Corp. v. Surgical Co., 587 F.3d 909, 918 (9th 
Cir. 2009)). 
120 See id. 
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issues before it.121 Thus, this prong of the analysis also supported the grant of an 
anti-suit injunction.122 
Finally, the court considered the potential impact of the proposed injunction 
on international comity, noting that the “[e]xtension of comity to a foreign 
judgment is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere 
courtesy and good will, upon the other.”123 In this case, the court found that 
comity concerns should not prevent the entry of an anti-suit injunction as 
Motorola did not initiate its German action until six months after Microsoft 
brought an action in Washington.124 Moreover, the court found that the suit was 
primarily a U.S. dispute lacking significant foreign issues and thus suggested 
that permitting the German injunction to stand could itself harm international 
comity.125 Next, the court found that the traditional analysis for preliminary 
injunctive relief also weighed in favor of granting the injunction.126 As a result, 
the district court entered the anti-suit injunction against Motorola.127 
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Motorola argued 
that Microsoft’s U.S. contract action would not necessarily resolve the German 
infringement action.128 Specifically, the breach of contract claim focused on 
whether Motorola must offer FRAND terms in its initial royalty offer, rather 
than only in the ultimate license, and whether Motorola’s initial royalty offer to 
Microsoft constituted a breach of Motorola’s FRAND commitment to ITU.129 
As such, Motorola argued, the resolution of the U.S. action would not be 
dispositive the German action, and concerns of vexatious litigation and prejudice 
would not be implicated.130 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s issuance of the 
anti-suit injunction.131 Citing the terms of Motorola’s commitment to ITU, the 
court reasoned that “the face of the contract makes clear that it encompasses not 
just U.S. patents, but all of Motorola’s standard-essential patents worldwide.”132 
Therefore, regardless of how the FRAND royalty was ultimately calculated, 
Motorola’s contractual commitment was incompatible with seeking an 




123 Id. at 1101 (quoting Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
124 Id, 
125 Id. (relying on Applied Med. Distribution, 587 F.3d at 921). 
126 Id. at 1102-03. 
127 Id. at 1103-1104. 
128 Microsoft II, 696 F.3d at 883. 
129 Id. at 879. 
130 Id. at 885-86. 
131 Id. at 889. 
132 Id. at 884. 
133 Id. at 885. 
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B. Vringo v. ZTE (U.S. — S.D.N.Y. (2015)) 
Vringo v. ZTE involved a multi-jurisdictional dispute over patents essential to 
ETSI’s 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless telecommunications standards.134 Following 
the commencement of litigation, the parties began settlement discussions and 
entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement (NDA).135 Once negotiations 
deteriorated, ZTE filed an antitrust action in Shenzhen, China, claiming that 
Vringo’s failure to grant ZTE a patent license on FRAND terms constituted an 
abuse of its market position.136 In order to support its claim, ZTE presented 
information that had been exchanged between the parties during the time that 
the NDA was in place.137 In response, Vringo brought a breach of contract action 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought an 
anti-suit injunction “[requiring] ZTE to withdraw its Shenzhen complaint and 
[enjoining] it from pursuing the same or similar claims in that court.”138 
The U.S. court declined to issue the requested anti-suit injunction, reasoning 
that the applicable threshold criteria had not been satisfied.139 Although the 
parties to the two suits were the same, the court noted “[a] decision holding that 
ZTE breached the NDA would not necessarily foreclose the antitrust action in 
the Shenzhen court.”140 Specifically, “[t]he fact that ‘ZTE use[d] Vringo’s 
highly confidential opening offer as the basis for its claims that the offer 
constitutes an abuse of power’ does not foreclose the possibility that ZTE 
provided or will provide the Shenzhen court with other evidence and reasons 
from which it could conclude that Vringo abused its market position.”141 
Accordingly, the court rejected Vringo’s motion for an anti-suit injunction.142 
C. TCL v. Ericsson (U.S. — C.D. Cal. (2015)) 
TCL v. Ericsson involved patents required to implement ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 
4G wireless telecommunications standards.143 TCL filed a contract claim against 
Ericsson in the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
“alleging that Ericsson breached its obligation to license [the patents at issue] to 
TCL on FRAND terms.”144 TCL also sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent 
 
134 Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988(LAK) 2015 WL 3498634, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 3, 2015). See also supra Part I.B. 
135 Id. at *3. 
136 Id. at *6. 
137 Id. at *7-*8. 





143 TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-
00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 29, 2015). See also 
supra Part I.C. 
144 Id. at *4. 
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Ericsson from maintaining patent infringement actions against it under 
corresponding patents in France, Brazil, Russia, the UK, Argentina and 
Germany.145 
In considering whether to grant TCL’s anti-suit injunction, Judge Selna 
recognized that the parties were the same in both the California and the foreign 
actions.146 Then, however, he dispensed with the remainder of the analysis, 
concluding instead that both parties “indicated their desire that this action should 
result in a ‘global resolution’ of the SEP patent licensing and damages 
claims.”147 Given the mutual desire to reach such a shared agreement, the court 
summarily granted TCL’s request for an anti-suit injunction without further 
discussion.148 
D. Apple v. Qualcomm (U.S. — S.D. Cal. (2017)) 
In 2017, Apple sued Qualcomm in the District Court for the Southern District 
of California, alleging sixty-three separate causes of action relating, among other 
things, to Qualcomm’s licensing practices for patents essential to ETSI’s 3G and 
4G standards.149 Shortly thereafter, Apple filed eleven additional actions against 
Qualcomm in the UK, Japan, China and Taiwan, each making similar 
allegations.150 In response, Qualcomm sought an anti-suit injunction seeking to 
enjoin the foreign actions. Qualcomm argued that the foreign actions constituted 
“part of a single licensing dispute already before [the California] court” and were 
thus duplicative.151 
The court disagreed, distinguishing the case from Microsoft v. Motorola, 
which Qualcomm relied heavily upon.152 According to the court, the U.S. 
contractual dispute in Microsoft pertained to Motorola’s alleged breach of its 
FRAND obligation to two SDOs.153 If decided adversely to Motorola, that 
dispute would prevent Motorola from pursuing its infringement action against 
Microsoft in Germany.154 In this case, however, it was Qualcomm, not Apple, 
that owed an obligation to the SDO.155As the court explained, “Apple, unlike 
 
145 See id. at *10-14. TCL also requested an anti-suit injunction against actions brought by 
Ericsson in the Eastern District of Texas. Id. at *2, *10-*11. Since these involved different 
patents and issues than the foreign actions, the anti-suit injunction was denied by the court 
with respect to the Texas actions. Id. at *15-*16. 
146 Id. at *17. 
147 Id. at *18. 
148 Id. at *19. 
149 Order Denying Anti-Suit Injunction, at 5-6, Apple Inc, v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
00108-GPC-MDD, (S.D. Cal., Sep. 7, 2017). 
150 Id. at 8. 
151 Id. at 10. 
152 Id. at 17-18. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 19. 
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Motorola and Qualcomm, has made no binding commitment that limits the relief 
that it may seek or how it may enforce that relief.”156 Thus, the court concluded 
that Qualcomm “failed to demonstrate that the issues in Apple’s U.S. and foreign 
actions [were] functionally similar in the sense that an adjudication [of the 
claims] on the merits [before the U.S. court] would dispose of [Apple’s foreign 
antitrust, infringement or other claims].”157 Likewise, the court found that none 
of the Unterweser factors applied in this case.158 Despite Qualcomm’s 
protestations to the contrary, Apple’s foreign suits could be considered neither 
vexatious nor oppressive, as they were not unduly delayed or duplicative, and 
because Apple had a reasonable interest in challenging Qualcomm’s patents 
jurisdiction by jurisdiction.159 
In addition, Qualcomm argued that allowing the foreign actions to proceed 
could require it to adjust its behavior by territory “to comply with potentially 
inconsistent rulings.”160 However, the court observed that Qualcomm had 
already been subject to multiple rulings regarding its anticompetitive conduct in 
countries including China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan,161 and had admitted to 
modifying its licensing practices to conform to those rulings country by 
country.162 Finally, the court found that enjoining Apple’s foreign actions 
“would effectively deprive the relevant foreign courts of [their] jurisdiction to 
consider whether [Qualcomm’s licensing agreements] have anticompetitive 
effects” within their jurisdictions — a result intolerable to international 
comity.163 Accordingly, the court denied Qualcomm’s request for an anti-suit 
injunction.164 
E. Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE (UK — High Court (Chancery) (2018)) 
In this UK case, Conversant owned four UK patents alleged to be essential to 
the implementation of ETSI mobile telecommunication standards.165 Conversant 
commenced a patent infringement suit against Huawei and ZTE, both Chinese 
manufacturers in July 2017,166 requesting that the UK court determine FRAND 
terms for a license of its global portfolio of patents covering the ETSI 
standards.167 Concurrently, ZTE brought an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 22. 
158 Id. at 23. 
159 See id. at 23-26. 
160 Id. at 29. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 33-34. 
164 Id. at 34. 
165 Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors [2018] 
EWHC (Pat) 808 [7] (Eng.). 
166 Id. at [4], [7]. 
167 Id. at [7]. 
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People’s Court in China requesting a determination of the FRAND royalty rate 
for Conversant’s Chinese patents and a declaration that Conversant’s prior 
licensing offers violated its FRAND commitments.168 In addition, ZTE “sought 
an injunction restraining Conversant from ‘unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory 
overpricing and other acts which are in violation of the FRAND principle,’” 
including continuation of the English proceedings, and a finding of liability 
against Conversant for such acts.169 
In response, Conversant alleged in the UK that ZTE’s pleadings in the 
Shenzhen case “directly attacked, and sought relief in respect of, the proceedings 
before the English court . . . and sought to block and frustrate the English 
[p]roceedings.”170 Accordingly, Conversant requested an anti-suit injunction 
barring ZTE from prosecuting its conflicting claims in Shenzhen.171 Soon 
thereafter, ZTE amended its Shenzhen complaint “to remove all claims for 
liability that might involve . . . damages or other financial relief . . . other than 
in relation to the FRAND royalty rate and FRAND licence terms for 
[Conversant’s] Chinese [p]atents.”172 
The court explained that the English test for granting an anti-suit injunction  
depended on whether the foreign claims “were vexatious, in that they sought to 
obstruct, or could have had the effect of obstructing, pending proceedings before 
the English court; or of undermining or frustrating the performance of a 
judgment given by the English court.”173 The court noted that, under the English 
test, the elements that ZTE had recently deleted from its Shenzhen complaint 
would have given rise to an anti-suit injunction.174 However, in view of the 
amended complaint, no such injunction was required.175 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal, though not addressing the Chancery 
Division’s anti-suit injunction ruling, rejected Huawei’s and ZTE’s forum non 
conveniens challenge to the jurisdiction of the English courts to establish global 
FRAND rates.176 
 
168 Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors [2018] 
EWHC (Ch) 2549 [10]-[12] (Eng.). 
169 Id. at [12(ii)], [12(v)]. 
170 Id. at [11]. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at [18]. 
173 Id. at [24] (citing Airbus v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 [133]-[140] (Eng.); Aerospatiale v 
Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 [892]-[897] (Eng.)). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. [2019] 
EWCA (Civ) 38 [127] (Eng.). 
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F. Optis v. Huawei (U.S. — E.D. Tex. (2018)) 
In Optis v. Huawei,177 PanOptis (an affiliate of Unwired Planet) brought suit 
against Huawei in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for 
the infringement of six U.S. patents that PanOptis obtained from Ericsson and 
Panasonic.178 In addition to denying infringement, Huawei asserted that 
PanOptis breached its FRAND commitment to ETSI (which it inherited from 
Ericsson and Panasonic) with respect to five of the asserted patents that were 
allegedly essential to ETSI’s 4G LTE standard.179 Shortly thereafter, Huawei 
brought suit against PanOptis in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in 
China, alleging breach of contract and antitrust violations.180 In the Shenzhen 
action, Huawei asked the court to set the FRAND royalty rate for PanOptis’s 
Chinese patents and to order that PanOptis cease all civil infringement actions 
against Huawei.181 In response, PanOptis filed a motion in the Eastern District 
of Texas seeking an anti-suit injunction preventing Huawei from continuing its 
Chinese actions.182 
In support of its motion, PanOptis first argued that the Chinese court’s 
injunction, if issued, would interfere with the jurisdiction of the Texas court.183 
However, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and rejected 
that argument based on Huawei’s written representation that it would not seek 
such an injunction.184 Next, PanOptis argued that Huawei’s Chinese actions 
were “duplicitous [sic]” of the Texas actions and therefore “vexatious and/or 
oppressive”.185 The court rejected these arguments as well, noting that: 
 
177 See supra Part I.C. 
178 Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 3, 6, 8, Optis Wireless 
Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-Cv-123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2017) 
[hereinafter Optis Complaint]. PanOptis and the other plaintiffs in this case are affiliates of 
Unwired Planet. Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 4. However, the U.S. patents 
asserted in this action were not part of the global license fashioned by the UK court in Unwired 
Planet v. Huawei. See supra Part I.C. 
179 Defendants Huawei Device USA Inc., and Huawei Device Co., Ltd.’s Amended 
Answer to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 32-33, Optis 
Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd., No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Huawei Answer to Optis]. 
180 Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 3. 
181 Id. at 3-4. 
182 Id. at 1. 
183 Id at 7. 
184 Report and Recommendation at 1, 3, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co. 
Ltd, No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Optis Magistrate’s 
Report on Anti-Suit Injunction] adopted by Order, Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei 
Techs. Co. Ltd, No. 2:17-Cv-00123-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2018) [hereinafter Order 
Denying Optis Anti-Suit Injunction]. 
185 Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 8-9. In its Motion, PanOptis conflates some 
of the Unterweser factors with precursor elements of the test for the grant of anti-suit 
injunctions. See id. at 7-10. For example, it treats the duplication (incorrectly characterized 
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the Chinese actions only relate to Chinese patents. Thus, although there 
may be similar factual disputes about PanOptis’s global offer, and whether 
that offer complied with its FRAND obligations, the scope of any relief 
awarded by this court or the Chinese court extends only as far as 
jurisdiction allows. There is nothing obviously vexatious or oppressive in 
allowing the lawsuits to proceed simultaneously, nor would any relief 
awarded by either court overlap with relief awarded by the other.186 
Accordingly, the court denied PanOptis’s motion for an anti-suit 
injunction.187 
G. Huawei v. Samsung (U.S. — N.D. Cal. (2018)) 
Unlike several of the cases discussed above (Unwired Planet v. Huawei, Optis 
v. Huawei), in this case Huawei held patents that it claimed were essential to 
ETSI’s 3G and 4G wireless standards.188 In 2011, Huawei and Samsung began 
to negotiate a cross-license of their respective patents.189 After failing to reach 
an agreement for several years, Huawei brought suit against Samsung in the 
Northern District of California, alleging that Samsung’s products infringed 
eleven patents allegedly essential to the ETSI standards.190 At the same time (or 
at most one day later, given time zone differences), Huawei filed suit against 
Samsung in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China.191 Samsung 
answered and filed counterclaims in both the Northern District of California and 
Shenzhen.192 
On January 11, 2018, the Shenzhen court found that Samsung infringed two 
of Huawei’s Chinese patents (both counterparts of patents asserted in the U.S. 
action), that Huawei had complied with its FRAND commitments to ETSI, that 
Samsung did not comply with its own FRAND commitments and was largely 
responsible for the six-year delay in negotiations.193 Accordingly, the Shenzhen 
court issued an injunction prohibiting Samsung from manufacturing and selling 
 
by PanOptis as duplicity) of issues under the “vexatious” prong of the Unterweser test, rather 
than as an initial requirement for such an injunction. See id. 
186 Optis Magistrate’s Report on Anti-Suit Injunction, supra note 184, at 2. Since none of 
the Unterweser factors were present, the court did not address PanOptis’s arguments 
regarding comity. See id. 
187 Order Denying Optis Anti-Suit Injunction, supra note 184. 
188 Compare Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction at 1, Huawei 
Techs., Co, Ltd v. Samsung Elecs. Co, Ltd., No 3:16-cv-02787-WHO (N.D. Cal., Apr. 13, 
2018) [hereinafter Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction] with Huawei 
Answer to Opti, supra note 179, at 32-33 and Optis Anti-Suit Motion, supra note 18, at 1. 
189 Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 3. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 4 n.5 and accompanying text. 
192 Id. at 3-4. 
193 Id. at 5. 
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smartphones with 4G LTE functionality in China.194 Samsung appealed the 
Chinese ruling on January 26, 2018 and, on February 1, filed a motion in the 
Northern District of California to enjoin Huawei from enforcing the Chinese 
injunction.195 
In analyzing Samsung’s motion for an anti-suit injunction, Judge Orrick in 
the Northern District of California first considered the similarity of the actions 
before the courts in the U.S. and China.196 He agreed with Huawei’s contention 
that the positions of the parties were reversed from that in Microsoft v. Motorola, 
in which an anti-suit injunction was granted, and on which Samsung relied.197 
That is, in Microsoft, the German court granted Motorola an injunction against 
Microsoft without determining whether or not Motorola had complied with its 
FRAND Commitment (a question before the U.S. court in Washington).198  
However, in this case, “the Shenzhen court issued injunctive relief because it 
found that Samsung had not complied with its FRAND obligations.”199 Thus, 
the cases before the U.S. and Chinese courts differed significantly.200 
Nevertheless, Judge Orrick found these differences “irrelevant” to the more 
important question: whether the local action would dispose of the foreign 
action.201 As both actions asked whether the other party breached its FRAND 
commitment to ETSI, the U.S. court’s answer to this question would, indeed, 
dispose of the Chinese action.202 
Next, after considering the Unterweser factors, Judge Orrick found that 
allowing the Chinese action to continue would undermine the U.S. court’s 
“ability to determine the propriety of injunctive relief in the first instance.”203 
Further, he considered that the Chinese injunction posed a significant 
commercial risk to Samsung, “not just in China, but with impacts percolating 
around the world”.204 As such, the Shenzhen injunction would “interfere with 
‘equitable considerations’ by compromising the court’s ability to reach a just 
result in the case before it free of external pressure on [Samsung] to enter into a 
 
194 Id. 
195 Id. For a detailed discussion of Judge Orrick’s decision in this case, see David Long, 
Judge Orrick Enjoins Huawei from Enforcing Injunction for Infringing SEPs Issued by 




196 See Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 5. 
197 Id. at 11-12. 
198 See id. at 12. 
199 Id. (emphasis in original). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 13. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 17. 
204 Id. 
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‘holdup’ settlement before the litigation is complete.”205 Accordingly, he found 
that the integrity of the U.S. action would “be lessened without an anti-suit 
injunction”.206 Finally, Judge Orrick found that the limited scope of the proposed 
anti-suit injunction (a single order relating to two Chinese patents) and its limited 
duration (it would likely be less than six months until the U.S. court determined 
whether Samsung had breached its FRAND commitment) would present a 
“negligible” impact on international comity.207 
Thus, for the above reasons, the court granted Samsung’s motion to enjoin 
Huawei from enforcing the Shenzhen orders.208 
H. (FR)Anti-Suit Injunctions — Trends and Analysis 
As discussed above, courts that consider anti-suit injunctions in cases 
involving FRAND licensing disputes apply a variety of analytical tests and 
frameworks.209 Nevertheless, there are a number of common criteria that courts 
use in such cases, which are summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of Selected FRAND Anti-Suit Injunction Decisions 




















No Yes Yes No Yes 
Vringo v. 
ZTE 














No No No Yes No 
 
205 Id. (quoting Microsoft II, 696 F.3d 872, 886 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
206 Id. at 17. Samsung also alleged that Huawei’s behaviour in bringing the Chinese actions 
was vexatious and oppressive, but the court did not agree. Id. at 19. 
207 Id. at 20. 
208 Id. at 21. 
209 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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UK, China Yes Yes No n/a Yes210 
Optis v. 
Huawei 
U.S., China No No No n/a No 
Huawei v. 
Samsung 
U.S., China No Yes No No Yes 
 
NOTE: “n/a” signifies that an issue was not discussed by the court in its reported 
decision. 
 
Table 2 consolidates the four major issues that courts adjudicating a request 
for an anti-suit injunction have considered in the FRAND cases discussed above 
(after satisfying the threshold condition that the local and foreign actions involve 
the same parties): (a) whether the local action involves essentially the same 
issues as the foreign action, (b) whether the local action will dispose of the issues 
in the foreign action, (c) whether the applicant for the injunction engaged in 
vexatious or other bad faith conduct in bringing or maintaining the foreign 
action(s), and (d) whether entry of the injunction would adversely impact 
international comity or policies of the local forum.211 
As the outcomes summarized in Table 2 demonstrate, there is essentially one 
“deciding” factor that appears to predict whether an anti-suit injunction will 
issue: whether the local action will be dispositive of the foreign action. The U.S. 
court’s determination that its decision would dispose of the German action in 
Microsoft I led to the entry of an anti-suit injunction, even though the issues 
before the two courts were not identical.212 In TCL v. Ericsson, the court 
considered only the parties’ apparent agreement that the U.S. action would 
dispose of the foreign actions in granting an anti-suit injunction.213 Finally, the 
U.S. courts’ decisions in Vringo v. ZTE, Apple v. Qualcomm and Optis v. Huawei 
— that the local action would not fully dispose of the foreign actions — led to 
the denial of the requested anti-suit injunctions.214 However, Huawei v. Samsung 
provides the clearest indication that the dispositive effect of the local action is 
 
210 An injunction would have been issued but for ZTE’s pre-emptive amendment of its 
foreign claims. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. & Ors 
[2018] EWHC (Ch) 2549 [33] (Eng.). 
211 See generally supra Part II. 
212 See supra Part II.A. 
213 See supra Part II.D. 
214 See supra Part II §§ B, D, F. 
1. CONTRERAS.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/19  12:07 PM 
2019] THE NEW EXTRATERRITORIALITY 279 
 
the predominant factor leading to issuance of an anti-suit injunction.215 There, 
the U.S. court held that the “undeniable and important differences” between the 
claims before the U.S. and Chinese courts were “irrelevant” to the overriding 
question of whether the resolution of the U.S. action would resolve the Chinese 
action.216 
The applicant’s vexatious behavior, though supporting the Microsoft I court’s 
entry of an anti-suit injunction, was not found necessary to satisfy the conditions 
for an injunction in Conversant or Huawei v. Samsung. In both of those cases 
the court found that an injunction was proper despite the fact that the party 
bringing the foreign action had not engaged in vexatious behavior. While the 
effect of an anti-suit injunction on international comity and local policy played 
a minor role in Microsoft I, Apple v. Qualcomm and Huawei v. Samsung, this 
factor was not addressed in the other cases. 
Thus, at least in the context of FRAND suits litigated over the past few years, 
the principal question to be answered when determining whether an anti-suit 
injunction will issue is whether or not the local action will be dispositive of the 
foreign actions sought to be enjoined. The effective reduction of the analysis to 
this single factor threatens to broaden greatly the availability of anti-suit 
injunctions in the future. 
III. THE ROYALTY-SETTING RACE 
A. International Coercion? 
As described in Parts I and II, courts in the U.S. and UK have become more 
capable of and willing to fashion global portfolio licenses between parties in 
order to resolve FRAND disputes. However, if courts in the UK and U.S. can 
set global royalty rates for standards-essential patents, then what of courts in 
Germany, France, Canada, India, Korea, Japan, China and a host of other 
countries?217 As a practical matter, any sophisticated court exercising 
jurisdiction over the parties can establish a global royalty rate for them.218 If the 
potential licensee refuses to enter into the global license fashioned by the court, 
 
215 See supra Part II.G. 
216 See Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit Injunction, supra note 188, at 13. 
217 This “me too” attitude is reflected in Unwired Planet I by Mr. Justice Birss, who noted 
that “courts all over the world have now set FRAND rates. I am sure the English court can do 
that as well.” Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [169] (Eng.). 
218 See Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential 
Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701, 724 (2019) [hereinafter Contreras, Global Rate-Setting] 
(“[A] court in any jurisdiction that has the parties before it can establish a global royalty rate 
for them. And if the licensee refuses to enter into the global license fashioned by the court, 
the licensee risks being enjoined from selling products in that country.”). 
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it risks being enjoined from selling products in that country.219 This is what the 
UK High Court identified in Vringo v. ZTE as “international coercion.”220 
Thus, in Unwired Planet I, Huawei could have refused to accept the UK 
court’s global license, but if it did so, it would have been enjoined from selling 
products in the lucrative UK market — a sacrifice of approximately one billion 
pounds per year.221 This is a Hobson’s Choice for any sizable product 
manufacturer: either accept a national court’s determination of global FRAND 
royalty rates or risk losing access to that jurisdiction’s national market. 
Furthermore, once the parties enter into a global license, there is little reason for 
courts in other jurisdictions to calculate either global FRAND rates or even 
FRAND rates for patents in their own jurisdictions. Thus, the first court to set a 
FRAND royalty rate for a particular set of parties will likely be the only one that 
will actually do so.222 
B. Race to the Bottom 
The intra-jurisdictional competition that is likely to emerge from the coercive 
situation described above can lead to two forms of legal “race”.223 First is a “race 
to the bottom” among jurisdictions — a well-documented phenomenon that has 
arisen across diverse areas of the law. For example, U.S. states such as Delaware 
have adopted rules streamlining the processes for incorporating entities and 
minimizing the potential liability of corporate directors,224 countries such as 
Liberia and Panama have created lax frameworks for the registration of maritime 
vessels,225 and U.S. states such as Nevada and Arizona have adopted regulations 
seeking to promote the testing of autonomous vehicles on their roads.226 
 
219 Vringo v. ZTE [2015] EWHC (Pat) 214 [109] (Eng.). 
220 Id. 
221 Personal notes of Jorge L. Contreras, Professor of Law, University of Utah College of 
Law, taken during observation of the oral argument in Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 
2344 (May 22, 2018) (on file with author). 
222 Aside from the jurisdictional “races” discussed in Parts B and C below, one might also 
question whether a court sitting in one country should even be deemed competent to set 
royalties for patents in other countries.  While parties may, and do, voluntarily agree to global 
licenses, it is another thing for a court to assume authority to do this against the will of (at 
least one of) the parties. If nothing else, this is a somewhat presumptuous assumption of 
authority by the court setting the global rate. 
223 See Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 42, at 13. 
224  See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to 
the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 381 (2005) (discussing adjustment of corporate 
law in Delaware). 
225 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation, 79 J. AIR L. 
& COMMERCE 151, 152-53 (2014) (contending that the ability of local jurisdictions to set their 
own maritime rules led to “a determined and successful race to the bottom”). See also, Kumar, 
supra note 8 (analogizing rules regarding maritime flags to intellectual property litigation). 
226 See, e.g., Mirada A. Schreurs & Sibyl D. Steuwer, Autonomous Driving — Political, 
Legal, Social, and Sustainability Dimensions, AUTONOMES FAHREN 151, 162-63 (M. Maurer 
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Jurisdictional competition also exists among tribunals within the same legal 
framework, as demonstrated by the successful efforts of the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas to adapt its procedural rules in a manner 
favorable to plaintiffs in patent litigation.227 
In each of these cases, the stringency of applicable procedural rules and 
substantive regulations has been relaxed or diluted. There are several reasons 
why courts, regulatory authorities and legislative bodies may engage in such 
races to the bottom.  First, they may genuinely feel that their rules and 
procedures are objectively superior to those of other jurisdictions, whether in 
terms of fairness, efficiency or competency.228 Second, they may feel that the 
rules of other jurisdictions have not treated their own citizens (whether 
individuals or corporations) fairly, and may enact rules that will better serve 
justice, at least for parties hailing from their jurisdiction.229 Finally, they may 
adjust their rules in order to attract business to their jurisdiction, often at the 
expense of consumer protection, worker rights, and product safety.230 
 
et al. eds., 2015) (pointing out manufacturer-friendly rules in states such as Nevada); Timothy 
B. Lee, The Way We Regulate Self-Driving Cars is Broken—Here’s How to Fix It, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/04/the-way-we-regulate-self-
driving-cars-is-broken-heres-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/UX6F-RKXH] (describing lax 
safety rules for autonomous vehicle testing in early-adopter states). 
227 See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a ‘Renegade’ Court: TC Heartland and the 
Eastern District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2018) (noting disproportionate 
share of patent litigation brought in Eastern District of Texas); Brian J. Love & James Yoon, 
Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 
20 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 6 (2017) (analyzing quantity of patent litigation brought 
in different federal district courts). The de facto dominance of the Eastern District of Texas 
in U.S. patent litigation may have come to an end following the Supreme Court’s 2017 
decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) 
(tightening minimum jurisdictional contact requirements for bringing suit). See Anderson, 
supra, at 1571 (“The case struck a direct blow against what Justice Scalia famously referred 
to as the ‘renegade jurisdiction’”). 
228 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical 
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ 
Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1480 (2009) (arguing that parties gravitate to courts in 
states such as New York and Delaware due to legitimate factors such as “their high degree of 
competence and for the integrity of the state’s judiciary”). 
229 See Morris, supra note 8, at 34 (“Even if one legal system prevails in the resolution of 
a conflict, the losing party will feel unsatisfied and can institute measures to make its own 
system applicable to other territories if it finds that its citizens or corporations have not been 
treated fairly. The prevailing wisdom is that, despite the pluralistic nature of the global legal 
order, certain territories’ laws are more supreme, and justice can only be achieved using those 
supreme laws.”) 
230 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 224 (discussing the view that Delaware adjusted its 
corporate law to attract business incorporations); Schreurs & Steuwer, supra note 226, at 162-
63 (noting that according to Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval, “Nevada is the first state in 
the country . . . [adopting] regulations for this vehicle . . . [and] it is important for Nevada to 
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Likewise, the tendency of courts in particular jurisdictions to determine high 
global FRAND rates or otherwise favor the positions of patent holders could 
attract patent holders to those jurisdictions.231 As one prominent English law 
firm suggests, the pro-patent Court of Appeal’s Unwired Planet judgments232 
“make clear that the English courts are an attractive venue for SEP owners to 
initiate FRAND litigation against companies with which they are struggling to 
agree [on] licence terms.”233 By the same token, jurisdictions that establish 
reputations for setting low global FRAND rates, or which are otherwise hostile 
to patent holders’ claims, may attract manufacturers seeking to challenge the 
rates that those patent holders offer.234 
When jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules and procedures, not to 
mention their substantive decisions, to attract litigants, a race to the bottom may 
emerge in which legal rules are progressively diluted in an effort to attract 
litigation to the jurisdiction.235 Given the disparities in treatment of the same 
issues by courts around the world, there is evidence that such forum shopping in 
the area of patent litigation already occurs and that this trend is only likely to 
continue.236 For example, a prominent international law firm advises that 
“[c]ompetitors looking for a good place to challenge patents will be interested 
in courts with a low patentee win rate.” 237 To that end, the same firm observes 
that the Patent Court in London is an “excellent” venue for invalidating a patent, 
 
be first on this.”); Lee, supra note 226  (“[C]ompetition to attract self-driving car companies 
has led to a race to the bottom in state safety rules”); Anderson, supra  note 227, at 1571 (“For 
many years, the judges in the Eastern District have encouraged patent plaintiffs to file their 
cases in the district”). 
231 See, e.g., Michael Elmer & Stacy Lewis, Where to Win: Patent-Friendly Courts 
Revealed, 2010 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 34, 40, 44 (2010). 
232 Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Eng.); Unwired Planet I [2017] EWHC 
(Pat) 711 (Eng.). 
233 Matthew Hunt & Pat Treacy, The Unwired Patent Appeal and Future Issues, 
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT (Dec. 18, 2018), reprinted in BRISTOWS (Jan. 30, 2019) 
https://www.bristows.com/news-and-publications/articles/the-unwired-planet-appeal-and-
future-issues/ [https://perma.cc/T25F-E8UQ]. See also Michael Burdon, Britannia Rules on 
SEPs – But is it FRAND? IPKAT BLOG, Feb. 21, 2019, 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/02/britannia-rules-on-seps-but-is-it-frand.html (“It seems 
that the balance in the UK has settled very much in the SEP owner’s favour”). 
234 See Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36. India could be such a jurisdiction, as might 
China. Id. at 38. 
235 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable 
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1163-64 (2013) 
(“[C]ompetition between jurisdictions . . . creates comity concerns” as well as other issues). 
236 See id. 
237 See, e.g., Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36 (discussing, inter alia, Finnegan’s 
Global IP Project). See generally Stefan Bechtold, Jens Frankenreiter & Daniel Klerman, 
Forum Selling Abroad, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2019) (observing jurisdictional jockeying among 
German courts). 
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that “Germany has a reputation for being patentee friendly,” and that litigants 
are well-advised to consider these factors when deciding where to commence 
suit.238 In fact, some commentators have argued that United States courts and 
agencies should better accommodate the litigation positions of particular parties 
(e.g., patent holders) to avoid losing out in this jurisdictional race to the 
bottom.239 
C. Race to the Courthouse 
This jurisdictional race to the bottom will, by design, result in particular 
jurisdictions’ rules favoring one party or another in litigation. It is likely to 
encourage a party to initiate litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction possible, 
as quickly as possible, often to foreclose a later suit in a less favorable 
jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race to the courthouse,”240 and 
may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather than negotiation or settlement. 
Far from being a mere theoretical possibility, such races are not only observed, 
but actively encouraged, by law firms that represent clients in multi-
jurisdictional patent litigation.241 Take, for example, one such firm’s 
recommendation that its clients adopt a “first strike strategy” by initiating patent 
litigation in the most favorable jurisdiction based on data compiled from about 
thirty different national judicial venues.242 
Scholars have also identified numerous procedural and substantive 
differences among U.S. jurisdictions that have driven forum selection decisions 
 
238 Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 36-37. 
239 See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or 
the Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation? 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 
701, 711 (2018) (“As the quality of administrative adjudication deteriorates at the ITC, patent 
holders engaged in global disputes over licensing or infringement can choose to litigate their 
multijurisdictional disputes before highly sophisticated tribunals in other countries”); 
Matthew Bultman, Patent Owners Taking Global View in Enforcement Efforts, LAW360 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1064658/patent-owners-taking-global-view-in-
enforcement-efforts (July 18, 2018) (quoting former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit Randall Rader as saying “The more the U.S. system is out of harmony 
with international standards, the more your international corporations will prefer to litigate 
elsewhere”). 
240 See Peter E. Herzog, Brussels and Lugano, Should You Race to the Courthouse or Race 
for a Judgment? 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 379 (1995); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your 
Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 402 (2010) (citations omitted) (“Forum shopping is alive 
and well in patent law. . . . [P]atent plaintiffs  . . . spend a great deal of time and effort worrying 
about where to file their case. Meanwhile, accused infringers play much the same game, 
looking for defense-favorable jurisdictions in which to file declaratory judgment actions. The 
result in many cases is a race to the courthouse.”). 
241 See Elmer & Lewis, supra note 231, at 34-36 
242 See id. 
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and the impetus to file quickly in those jurisdictions.243 And even though courts 
criticize such jurisdictional races as “disorderly” attempts at “procedural 
fencing,”244 most courts (at least in U.S. patent cases) typically defer to the 
choice of forum made by the first party to file, further encouraging parties to 
engage in such races to the courthouse.245 
In response to the UK High Court’s fashioning of a global patent license for 
the parties in Unwired Planet I, on appeal Huawei raised the specter of such an 
international race to the courthouse.246 That is, if national courts are empowered 
to establish global royalty rates and other terms for private FRAND licenses, a 
veritable parade of horribles could ensue: 
[I]mplementers may be faced with the threat of injunctions which 
effectively deprive them of their ability to defend their FRAND positions 
before the courts of the territories where the relevant SEPs subsist; courts 
will set rates for [patents] over which they have no jurisdiction; the 
judgment of a single court in a jurisdiction in which an implementer does 
not wish to litigate may create a res judicata as between it and the [patent] 
owner in relation to the terms of a global licence, and this might be very 
unfair.247 
However, the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding “nothing 
unfair” about allowing “a court in one country [to] decide, as between the 
parties, whether a global or multi-territorial licence is FRAND.”248 In particular, 
the court held that a single court’s determination of a global license “does not 
deprive a licensee from challenging the validity and essentiality of [patents] in 
any [other] jurisdiction where it may choose to do so.”249 Thus, even if a global 
license is rendered by a national court, a licensee may challenge its patents in 
other jurisdictions. But to what avail? As noted in Part I.B, once parties sign a 
 
243 See Lemley, supra note 240, at 402-03. See also generally, Chester S. Chuang, 
Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent 
Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065 (2012); Robert T. Sherwin, Shoot First, Litigate 
Later: Declaratory Judgment Actions, Procedural Fencing, and Itchy Trigger Fingers, 70 
OKLA. L. REV. 793 (2018). 
244 See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 591 n.4, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(discussed in Sherwin, supra note 243, at 797). 
245 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the 
forum of the first filed case is favored, unless considerations of judicial and litigant economy, 
and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require otherwise.”). 
246 Unwired Planet II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 [101] (Eng.). 
247 Id. However, Huawei’s argument is somewhat ironic, given that the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California in Huawei v. Samsung observed that Huawei’s own 
initiation of legal actions against Samsung in Shenzhen, China (Huawei’s home city) 
“implicate[ed] concerns of forum shopping”. Order Granting Samsung’s Motion for Antisuit 
Injunction, supra note 188, at 18. 
248 Unwired II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 [104]. 
249 Id. 
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global license, challenging patent validity in one country or another becomes far 
less rewarding except in the rare case that all of a party’s patents in a particular 
country are invalidated.250 
The Court of Appeal went on to describe the practical difficulties that patent 
holders could face if national courts were not empowered to set global royalty 
rates: 
On the assumption that only a country by country approach to licensing is 
FRAND, a patentee in the position of [Unwired Planet] would face not just 
the needless expense of negotiating and managing licenses on a country by 
country basis but also the problem of dealing with a potential licensee 
which is holding-out and refusing to engage in a reasonable way with the 
negotiation process. The patentee must then bring proceedings country by 
country to secure the payment of the royalties to which it is entitled. But 
unlike a normal patent action, where an unsuccessful defendant faces the 
prospect of an injunction, the reluctant licensee would know that, on the 
assumption it could only be required to take licences country by country, 
there would be no prospect of any effective injunctive relief being granted 
against it provided it agreed to pay the royalties in respect of its activities 
in any particular country once those activities had been found to infringe.251 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal in Unwired Planet II found that the burdens 
of a global license did not outweigh its practical benefits or make it inappropriate 
for a UK court to determine.252 In sum, the courts that have considered this issue 
 
250 Traditionally, large standards-essential patents holders have held a broad portfolio of 
patents, conferring rights in many major jurisdictions, making it unlikely that all of the patent 
holder’s patents in any given country would ever be invalidated. TIM POHLMANN & KNUT 
BLIND, IPLYTICS GMBH, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPS) 3, 
27 (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20741/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/na
tive [https://perma.cc/8N9Q-DZDK]. In recent years, however, large patent holders have 
increasingly transferred their patents to patent assertion entities (PAEs), such as Unwired 
Planet, Vringo, Conversant, PanOptis, St. Lawrence, Innovatio, Wi-LAN, etc., for 
enforcement. This practice is referred to as “privateering”. See, e.g., D. DANIEL SOKOL, 
PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 72 (D. Daniel Sokol ed., 2017); see 
also Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: 
Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 690, 694 (2017) (“An increasing number 
of operating companies that were or are active in standards development appear to be 
transferring some or all of their SEPs to patent assertion entities (PAEs) for enforcement”). 
As a result, PAEs now hold relatively small numbers of patents, and the invalidation of all of 
a particular PAE’s patents in a particular jurisdiction may not be a remote possibility. 
251 Unwired II [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 at [111]. 
252 Id. at [113]. Interestingly, the court’s reasoning in Unwired Planet II assumes that 
licensees who “hold out” and refuse to enter into license agreements on FRAND terms will 
suffer no penalty save for having to pay the otherwise FRAND royalty rate years later - once 
the patent holder eventually prevails in each relevant jurisdiction. See id. at [5]-[6], [57]. 
However, this is not necessarily the case, particularly in jurisdictions like the U.S. where 
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appear to be comfortable with, or at least not opposed to, the prospect of a 
jurisdictional race to the bottom coupled with a litigant race to the courthouse. 
D. The Finish Line? 
In the context of multinational patent licensing, both the jurisdictional race to 
the bottom and the litigant race to the courthouse have already begun. As shown 
above, courts’ increasing willingness to compete in and facilitate these races, 
coupled with the liberalization in application of the anti-suit injunction,253 belie 
a trend that is not likely to reverse of its own accord. In the end, it may simply 
be that forum shopping and races to the bottom are inevitable consequences of 
unregulated multinational marketplaces in which global disputes are litigated in 
national forums. 
Nevertheless, litigation and jurisdictional races are costly for markets and 
market participants. They distort the processes and motivations behind judicial 
and administrative rulemaking — substituting national desires to attract business 
for just and evenhanded application of the law. Moreover, they incentivize 
litigation “first strikes” when negotiation or compromise might be more 
appropriate and efficient. Accordingly, such races would ideally be eliminated 
in this increasingly important and internationalized commercial realm. As 
observed by one English practitioner, “The problem is only going to get more 
complex and more important … As well as moving into the next generation of 
telecom standards, the world is increasingly dealing with the connected world 
and the Internet of Things … involving a wide range of industries including 
telecoms, tech providers, automotive and broadcasting.”254 
In response to this situation, several commentators, including the author, 
viewing litigation and judicial dispute resolution as inherently inefficient, costly 
and compromised,255 have proposed a range of private ordering solutions to 
resolve or forestall disputes involving standard-essential patents and FRAND 
licensing. These proposals have included mandatory “ex ante” rate 
 
penalties for bad faith behavior, including wilful patent infringement, exist. See generally 
Contreras, et al., supra note 12, at 293 (discussing enhanced damages against potential 
licensees who strategically refuse to enter into FRAND license agreements). Thus, penalties 
could be another measure on which jurisdictions compete with one another: those that 
penalize holdout behavior may more attractive to patent holders, while those that do not may 
be more attractive to potential licensees. 
253 As noted in Part II G, the only reliable test for whether or not such an injunction will 
issue appears to be whether or not the action in the enjoining court will be dispositive of 
actions in the courts that are sought to be enjoined. 
254 Burdon, supra note 233. 
255 See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not 
Be Set by the Courts, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTEL. PROP. 19 (2016) (arguing that courts are 
undesirable adjudicators of FRAND disputes). 
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disclosures,256 collective rate agreements,257 expedited bilateral arbitration,258 
global rate-setting tribunals,259 patent pooling structures,260 and more.261 
Yet, there are reasons to hold out hope for judicial resolution of these disputes. 
Despite all of their challenges, judicial decisions carry with them an institutional 
legitimacy that may be difficult to replicate through private means.262 While 
there is no general international treaty relating to jurisdiction or recognition of 
national judgments,263 such treaties exist on a regional basis, most notably within 
 
256 See, e.g., Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck & Hans Zenger, Transparency, 
Predictability, and Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing: A Report for 




f [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-8FHG]. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and 
Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163 (2013) 
(describing ex ante rate disclosure policies adopted and proposed at several SDOs). 
257 See, e.g., Luke McDonagh & Enrico Bonadio, Standard Essential Patents and the 
Internet of Things, at 30 (Jan. 2019) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/608854/IPOL_IDA(2019)6088
54_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU75-5NDA] (asserting that EU institutions should allow SDO 
participants to negotiate collectively for SEP royalty rates); Contreras, Aggregated, supra note 
250, at 690, 692, 694, 700-01, 709 (calling on antitrust authorities to recognize that SDO 
collective rate-setting should be permitted and encouraged). See generally Contreras, Fixing 
FRAND, supra note 9, at 78-84 (proposing mechanism for collective SDO negotiation of 
FRAND royalty rates); Besen, supra note 255 (arguing that SDOs, rather than courts, are best-
equipped to make FRAND royalty determinations). 
258 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 235, at 1135, 1141 (proposing that FRAND rate 
disputes be resolved through mandatory best offer arbitration). 
259 See generally Contreras, Global Rate-Setting, supra note 218 (proposing global, non-
governmental rate-setting to determine FRAND rates). 
260 See Microsoft IV, 795 F.3d at 1042-1045 (describing licensing pools for H.264 and Wi-
Fi patents); Besen, supra note 255, at 32-34; McDonagh & Bonadio, supra note 257, at 30; 
Régibeau et al., supra note 256, at 31. 
261 See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fiona Scott Morton & Howard Shelanski, Standard Setting 
Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 3-4; Mark Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup 
of Standards (and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 161-67 (2007); Marc Rysman & Timothy 
Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 35 TELECOM. POLICY 1010 
(2011). 
262 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, 
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2014) (arguing that 
private arbitration agreements, particularly those arising from consumer contracts of 
adhesion, lack procedural and constitutional legitimacy). 
263 See, e.g., Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicial-
asst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html [https://perma.cc/FES6-KVFZ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) 
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the European Union.264 Moreover, treaty instruments covering limited aspects 
of international jurisdiction exist, including the 2005 Hague Choice of Court 
Agreements Convention, which validates forum selection clauses in certain 
types of private international agreements.265 Even without broadly-applicable 
treaty mechanisms, a number of international devices are available to facilitate 
the coordination of litigation across jurisdictions. For example, statutory 
mechanisms exist within the U.S. and EU to specify and limit the types of 
damages that parties may seek in national courts in private international antitrust 
cases.266 
Other efforts are under way to develop instruments for the greater 
coordination of international jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments, 
including a Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments, which is currently being negotiated at The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law.267 While the Hague Convention, if adopted, could 
offer international rules pertaining to jurisdictional issues, so-called “soft law” 
instruments have also been proposed in this area.268 For example, specific to 
intellectual property law, the American Law Institute has developed a set of 
Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in 
Transnational Disputes based on earlier work by Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss 
and Jane Ginsburg.269 Further, with respect to anti-suit injunctions specifically, 
 
(“There is no bilateral treaty or multilateral convention in force between the United States and 
any other country on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments”). 
264 See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16-19. 
265 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 3, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 
1294, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/510bc238-7318-47ed-9ed5-e0972510d98b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9UY-SEZ3]. 
266 See generally James L McGinnis, Oliver Heinisch, & Nadezdha Nikonova, The Rapidly 
Changing Landscape of Private Global Antitrust Litigation: Increasingly Serious 
Implications for U.S. Practitioners, 25 COMPETITION 1 (2016). 
267 Request for Comments and Notice of Public Meeting on a Preliminary Draft 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Currently Being 
Negotiated at The Hague Conference on Private International Law, 81 Fed. Reg. 81741-44 
(Nov. 18, 2016). See also The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L. LAW, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments [https://perma.cc/F6EX-
LGSY] (describing recent activity regarding the aforementioned draft Convention). 
268 “Soft law” refers to legal principles embodied in guidelines, norms or agreements that 
generally lack the binding force of law, but guide behavior in any event. See Daniel Thürer, 
Soft Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1469 
[https://perma.cc/49FL-BZZ7] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
269 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE 
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (AM. LAW. INST. 2008). See also 
Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why 
Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 820-26 (2005); Dinwoodie, supra note 8, at 720-
21 (discussing genesis and history of ALI Principles). 
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Professor Tom Cotter has proposed the development of more consistent “best 
practices” that could be adopted by courts adjudicating these cases.270 
Perhaps the most effective solution to the jurisdictional disharmony illustrated 
by this essay would be the enactment of a single, global patent system.271 Such 
a system would eliminate the ability of a court sitting in one country to decide 
patent royalties for patents issued in many other countries, as a single, global 
patent could cover the entire world.  While the prospect of a global patent system 
resonates with increasingly global product and service markets in which national 
borders seem to have less and less relevance, from a practical standpoint there 
appears to be little chance of such a system emerging in the foreseeable future.272 
While the respective futures of these various efforts are uncertain, they at least 
demonstrate that the private international law community recognizes the 
necessity of improved legal mechanisms to avoid the unproductive litigation 
races described in this essay. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay shows that, even absent any violation of national law, national 
courts have begun to use disputes over domestic patent rights as vehicles for 
shaping the global business arrangements of private parties. This tendency is 
particularly pronounced in disputes over standards-essential patents and the 
FRAND terms on which they are licensed. Aided by tools such as the anti-suit 
injunction and injunctions preventing local sales of infringing products, courts 
in the U.S., UK and elsewhere have increasingly sought to define such global 
 
270 Thomas Cotter, Upcoming Talks on Extraterritoriality and Patent Remedies, COMP. 
PAT. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2019), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2019/01/upcoming-talks-on-
extraterritoriality.html [https://perma.cc/SF4E-MLMQ] (suggesting that courts should limit 
“antisuit injunctions, in the [FRAND] context, to cases in which enforcement in another 
jurisdiction would frustrate the domestic court’s ability to render judgment”). 
271 See, e.g., Q. Todd Dickinson, The Long-Term International View of Patents and 
Trademarks, in 4 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & POLICY 14-1 - 14-2 (Hugh 
C. Hansen, ed., 2000) (“there definitely should be a global patent system of some sort . . . I 
think we can all list probable benefits of such a system: reduced costs for inventors and for 
their assignees, dramatically simpler protection, and uniformity of that protection throughout 
the world.”); John H. Barton, Issues Posed by a World Patent System, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 341, 
344 (2004) (“There is little excuse for maintaining parallel national patent systems in a world 
of international trade.”) 
272 And even if such a global patent system might solve the immediate problem posed by 
this essay, there are many reasons to question whether such a system would be desirable more 
generally.  See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 685, 726 (2002) (“A consolidation of existing patent systems into a single monolith 
would impoverish the field; it would be mass extinction of legal species. Diversity has its own 
worth; it permits competition and breeds innovation.”); Barton, supra note 271, at 352-57 
(pointing out numerous practical difficulties with the implementation of a world patent 
system). 
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contractual arrangements between multinational firms solely on the basis of 
patents asserted within their jurisdictions. As a result, evidence that jurisdictions 
are developing positions favoring a given party in such disputes already exists. 
This trend threatens a jurisdictional race to the bottom in their substantive and 
procedural rules. Likewise, multinational litigants are adopting strategies 
designed to bring suit in favorable jurisdictions as quickly as possible to achieve 
“first strike” advantages. These unproductive litigation races distort the 
processes and motivations behind judicial and administrative rulemaking — 
substituting national desires to attract business for just and evenhanded 
application of the law — and incentivize litigation when negotiation or 
compromise might be more appropriate and efficient. Accordingly, 
multijurisdictional solutions are needed to address these problems, whether they 
arise through private ordering, international agreement or soft law mechanisms. 
 
